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THE FALLACY OF DUELING SOVEREIGNTIES:
WHY THE SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO
ELIMINATE THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
DOCTRINE
Kevin J. Hellmann*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Sergeant Stacey Koon of the Los Angeles Police
Department was convicted of federal civil rights violations for his
involvement in the brutal beating of Rodney King.' Sergeant
Koon's conviction occurred one year after he had been acquitted of
state charges for police misconduct based on the same beating.2
The conviction of Sergeant Koon vividly demonstrates how the
dual sovereignty doctrine can subject criminal defendants to
successive prosecutions for the same act.
The text of the Constitution indicates that successive pros-
ecutions such as these violate the double jeopardy clause of the
Fifth Amendment? On its face, the double jeopardy clause protects
individuals from being twice put in jeopardy of life and limb for
the same offense.4 Yet the Supreme Court continues to allow
* BLS Class of 1995. The author wishes to thank BLS Professor Susan N.
Herman for her assistance in conceiving and preparing this article.
'United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
2 Seth Mydans, Verdict In Los Angeles; Points of Evidence, Not Emotion,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1993, § 1, at 33; Jim Newton, 2 Officers Guilty, 2
Acquitted; Guarded Calm Follows Verdicts in King Case, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 18,
1993, at Al.
3 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 id.
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successive prosecutions under the dual sovereignty doctrine5 as an
exception to this constitutional protection.
As a constitutional guarantee, double jeopardy protection has
never been absolute.' Among the exceptions to the double jeopar-
dy clause, the dual sovereignty doctrine is arguably the most
criticized.7 Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a defendant may
be prosecuted twice for the same act when that act violates both
state and federal law.'
The dual sovereignty doctrine applies to a wide variety of
reprosecutions. 9 According to the Supreme Court, the government
5 'The dual sovereignty doctrine provides that when a defendant in a single
act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of
each, he has committed two distinct 'offences' for double jeopardy purposes."
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377, 382 (1922)). Such an act is not protected by the double jeopardy clause and,
therefore, can be prosecuted successively by both federal and state governments.
Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.
6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1063-65
(2d ed. 1992).
7 See generally Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and
the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1961); Harlan R. Harrison,
Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of Human Rights,
17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 306 (1963); Dominic T. Holzhaus, Double Jeopardy and
Incremental Culpability: A Unitary Alternative to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1986); Kenneth M. Murchison, The Dual Sovereignty
Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383 (1986);
George C. Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy, 14 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 700 (1963); Lawrence Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of
Successive Prosecution, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1961); see also LAFAVE, supra
note 6, at 1058 ("It. .. is not surprising that the [Supreme] Court has been led
on more than one occasion to 'rethink' and revise seemingly settled aspects of
its double jeopardy jurisprudence, and it would not be surprising if that process
of rethinking and revision were continued in the future.").
8 LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 1063.
9 This Note will use the terms "successive prosecutions" and "reprosecutions"
interchangeably to refer to the situation involving consecutive prosecutions
conducted by federal and state governments against the same defendant for
committing the same act.
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may reprosecute a defendant whose act has violated both federal
and state law irrespective of which level of government has
conducted the initial prosecution and regardless of the result of that
initial prosecution."° Every reprosecution allowed by the dual
sovereignty doctrine, however, is based on a single act committed
by the defendant."
Several Supreme Court decisions illustrate the effects of the
dual sovereignty doctrine. 2 The Supreme Court allows repros-
ecutions regardless of whether the state government or the federal
government prosecutes initially. For example, unlike United States
v. Koon, 3 in which the state prosecuted first, the defendant in
Bartkus v. Illinois4 was convicted on state robbery charges after
he had been acquitted of violating the Federal Bank Robbery
Statute.
Additionally, the Supreme Court allows reprosecutions regard-
less of whether the initial prosecution results in an acquittal or not.
Unlike Koon, 5 in which the defendant was acquitted in the first
10 LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 1056-58.
"LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 1063.
12 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (defendant was convicted
by two separate states for the same act); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959) (defendants were convicted in federal court for conspiring to damage a
means of communication operated by the United States after being convicted for
the same act on a state charge of conspiring to damage property of telephone
companies); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959)
(defendant was convicted on a state robbery charge after being acquitted of
violating the Federal Bank Robbery Statute in federal court for the same act);
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (defendants were convicted in
federal court for violating the National Prohibition Act after being convicted for
the same act under a state law that prohibited making, transporting, and selling
intoxicating liquors).
13 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
'4 359 U.S. 121.
'5 833 F. Supp. 769.
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prosecution, the defendants in Abbate v. United States 6 had
already been convicted of violating an Illinois statute, which
prohibited conspiracy to damage property of telephone companies,
when they were charged and convicted of conspiring to damage a
means of communication controlled or operated by the United
States. Subsequent sections of this Note will fully explore vari-
ations of reprosecutions.
The dual sovereignty doctrine permits reprosecutions based
upon the same act committed by the same defendant. 7 Among
reprosecutions, the similarity of the charges often underscores the
fact that the defendant is being reprosecuted for the same act. The
defendant in United States v. Aboumoussallem,18 for example, was
convicted on drug charges in federal court after he had been
acquitted of identical charges in state court. Similarly, the defen-
dant in Williams v. Carlson'9 was convicted in federal court for
Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Automobile after he had been
convicted in the District of Columbia for Unauthorized Use of an
Automobile.
The Supreme Court has upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine
based on public policy concerns.20 The Court's primary concern
is that the elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would
destroy federalism by jeopardizing the distinct separation of powers
16 359 U.S. 187.
'7 LAFAvE, supra note 6, at 1063.
'8 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984).
19 826 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
20 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (Court protected states'
power to enforce their own criminal laws); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187 (1959) (Court protected the efficiency of federal law enforcement); Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959) (Court protected
balance of prosecutorial powers between federal and state governments); United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (Court protected government's power to
fully prosecute an offense that violates both federal and state law).
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between federal and state governments.2' The Court fears that
without the dual sovereignty doctrine, federal and state govern-
ments would compete for the opportunity to exclusively prosecute
defendants whose single act violates both federal and state law.22
The Court anticipates that, in a single-prosecution system,23 this
intergovernmental competition would inevitably deny one level of
government its chance to prosecute a dual sovereignty offense.
The Supreme Court, however, relies on a traditional concept of
federalism which no longer applies in the modern prosecutorial
system. The modern system features a substantial overlap rather
than a distinct separation between state and federal criminal
jurisdictions.24 This Note's evaluation of the dual sovereignty
doctrine as it is applied within the current prosecutorial system
reveals that, contrary to the Court's concerns, the elimination of the
dual sovereignty doctrine would not destroy federalism.
By evaluating the dual sovereignty doctrine, this Note also
reveals that the continuation of the doctrine is bad public policy.
First, the dual sovereignty doctrine does not help to achieve the
goals of criminal justice, since it encourages vindictive prosecutions
at the expense of defendants' rights. Preservation of defendants'
individual rights far outweighs the continuation of the dual
sovereignty doctrine, especially when the sacrifice of individual
rights fails to remedy the conduct which the government seeks to
deter. For instance, the reprosecution of Sergeant Koon for beating
Rodney King has not helped resolve the real social problems of
21 Franz L. Neumann, Federalism and Freedom: A Critique, in FEDERALISM:
MATURE AND EMERGENT 44, 52-53 (Arthur W. Macmahon ed., 1955).
22 See Heath, 474 U.S. at 93 (O'Connor, J.) (different criminal jurisdictions
would compete in a "race to the courthouse" to conduct initial prosecution).
2- This note will use the term "single-prosecution system" to refer to the
system of criminal prosecution that would exist in the absence of the dual
sovereignty doctrine.
24 See generally Murchison, supra note 7.
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racism and police misconduct.
Second, the continued application of the dual sovereignty
doctrine runs the risk of diminishing public faith in the judicial
system. In the event that a defendant is prosecuted twice for the
same act and each prosecution reaches a different verdict, our
system of justice appears unpredictable, if not unfair. The dual
sovereignty doctrine further tarnishes the integrity of the judicial
system by permitting reprosecutions in response to political or
public pressure.26 For instance, the reprosecution of Sergeant
Koon and his fellow police officers was conducted in the wake of
widespread rioting in Los Angeles.27 The reprosecution seemed to
be the courts' reaction to public unrest and gave the impression
that our judicial system's objective goals of truth and justice are
2' Joseph Berger, The Nation; A Badge Is Less a Shield When Police Go Too
Far, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, § 4, at 3; Halford H. Fairchild, Perspectives On
Justice In Los Angeles; Drip By Drip, The Indignities Go On, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
19, 1993, at B7.
26 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, A Plea To Reno For Prosecution On Crown
Heights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Labaton, A Plea to Reno];
Stephen Labaton, Reno To Take Over Inquiry In Slaying In Crown Heights, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Labaton, Reno To Take Over]. In
November 1992, Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes unsuccessfully
prosecuted Lemrick Nelson, an African-American indicted for murdering Yankel
Rosenbaum, an Hasidic Jew, in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn, New
York, on August 18, 1991. Subsequently, Hynes requested that Janet Reno,
United States Attorney General, reprosecute Lemrick Nelson for the Rosenbaum
murder as a violation of federal civil rights law (Rosenbaum's murder occurred
on the same night that another Hasidic Jew was involved in a car accident in
Crown Heights, killing Gavin Cato, a 7-year old African-American, which led
to violent rioting). The racial tension involved in this case has heightened public
pressure to reprosecute Nelson. Statements from elected officials and community
leaders have also increased the outcry for reprosecution. In addition, the
perception that political pressure has driven the efforts to reprosecute Nelson was
compounded when District Attorney Hynes announced his candidacy for New
York State Attorney General in January 1994, raising suspicion about his motive
to persuade United States Attorney General Reno to conduct a federal pros-
ecution after he unsuccessfully prosecuted in state court.
27 Joseph Kelner, Rodney King II: Civil Rights On Trial, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23,
1993, at 3.
DUELING SOVEREIGNTIES
partial to public outcry and political influence.28
Finally, the elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would
present an opportunity to better manage the conflict between the
government's interest in law enforcement and defendants' interest
in protecting their constitutional rights. The probable impact of
eliminating the dual sovereignty doctrine and instituting a single-
prosecution system would restore defendants' rights without
jeopardizing the government's prosecutorial authority.
This Note analyzes the impact of a single-prosecution system
on federalism by exploring how criminal prosecution can be
effective without applying the dual sovereignty doctrine. Section II
evaluates the Supreme Court's rationale that historical precedent
and stare decisis support the continuation of the dual sovereignty
doctrine. Section III argues that the courts should cease to apply
the dual sovereignty doctrine. It questions the Court's application
of the doctrine as legal fiction, dicta, and a tool for promoting an
obsolete model of federalism. Section IV evaluates the Supreme
Court's reluctance to eliminate the dual sovereignty doctrine. By
projecting the impact of a single-prosecution system, this section
discusses the many benefits a single-prosecution system would
produce, including: maintaining the balance of prosecutorial power
between federal and state governments; increasing the quality of
prosecution; deterring sham prosecutions; preserving federal civil
rights; and enhancing the efficiency of the judicial system. In
addition, this section discusses how the expansion of federal and
state prosecutorial jurisdictions for dual sovereignty offenses would
enable a single-prosecution system to increase the quality of
prosecution while prosecuting both offenses. Finally, this Note
concludes that the elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine to
create a single-prosecution system would not destroy federalism.
2' Seth Mydans, The Nation; Looking To Courts for Catharsis, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1993, § 4, at 3.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S RATIONALE FOR UPHOLDING THE
DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE
A. Historical Background of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
The dual sovereignty doctrine was conscripted into the
American legal system from English common law as a rule
designed to recognize the distinct sources of authority between
separate nations.2 9 Originally, under the dual sovereignty doctrine,
a criminal defendant whose actions violated the criminal laws of
two separate nations could be prosecuted by both sovereigns. For
example, in the case of R. v. Thomas,3 ° the defendant's single act
violated both Welsh and English law. Since, under the dual
sovereignty doctrine, both sovereigns could enforce their respective
laws, the jurisdiction of neither sovereign was compromised by the
defendant, whose single act violated the laws of these separate
sovereigns.3'
The Supreme Court has often emphasized that citizens in a
system of federalism owe allegiance to separate sovereigns, which
exist in the form of federal and state governments.32 Therefore,
the Court has concluded that "dual citizens" are subject to the
penalties of both sovereigns when their actions violate both federal
29 LEONARD G. MILLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 2-3
(1968).
30 1 Sid. 179, 82 Eng. Rep. 1043; 1 Lev. 118, 83 Eng. Rep. 326; I Keb. 663,
83 Eng. Rep. 1172 (K.B. 1662), cited with approval in J.A.C. Grant, Successive
Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Compar-
isons, 4 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8 n.29 ("All three reports must be used to secure a
full account of the case.").
3' Grant, supra note 30, at 8.
32 See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (defendants were
convicted of federal violation after state conviction for same act); Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959) (defendant was
convicted of state violation after federal acquittal for same act); Lanza v. United
States, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (defendants were convicted of state violation after
federal conviction for same act).
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and state laws.33 By preserving the dual authority of the federal
and state governments to successively prosecute a defendant for the
same act when that act violates both federal and state law, the dual
sovereignty doctrine reinforces a traditional concept of federalism.
Without the dual sovereignty doctrine, the Court fears that either
the federal government or the state governments would surrender
their respective power to prosecute violations of their own criminal
laws.
B. Stare Decisis Promotes Continuation of the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine
The dual sovereignty doctrine has existed in American case law
since the middle of the nineteenth century.34 In 1922, the Supreme
Court decided the leading case supporting the dual sovereignty
doctrine, United States v. Lanza.35 In Lanza, Chief Justice Taft
concluded that "an act denounced as a crime by both national and
state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of
both and may be punished by each. 3 6 The Court reaffirmed
Lanza in 1959 when the Court held, in Abbate v. United States,37
that the double jeopardy clause does not protect a criminal
defendant from successive prosecutions by federal and state
governments. That same year, in Bartkus v. Illinois,38 Justice
Frankfurter referred to the previous cases upholding the dual
sovereignty doctrine as an "unbroken, unquestioned course of
impressive adjudication."3 9 More recently, the Court has expanded
13 Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.
34 Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
35 260 U.S. 377.
36 Id. at 382.
37 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
1" 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
'9 Id. at 136.
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the dual sovereignty doctrine in its 1985 decision, Heath v.
Alabama.40 The defendant in Heath was convicted of "malice
murder" for arranging the kidnapping and murder of his wife and
was sentenced to life imprisonment in Georgia, where the body was
found. He was subsequently convicted of committing murder
during kidnapping, for the same act, and was sentenced to death in
Alabama, where his wife had resided. The Court in Heath held that
separate states are both permitted to prosecute a defendant for the
same act.4 The Court relies upon this long-standing precedent to
continue upholding the dual sovereignty doctrine.
III. THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE SHOULD BE ELIMINATED
Despite the Supreme Court's continued allowance of successive
prosecutions under the dual sovereignty doctrine, opponents of the
doctrine decry it as a fundamentally flawed legal principle. They
contend that the dual sovereignty doctrine is based on legal
fiction.4' Commentators also deride the Court's "devoted servi-
tude"'43 to the dual sovereignty doctrine, which they criticize as
merely a loophole through which the government deprives
defendants of their constitutional protection against double
jeopardy.' They question the Court's promotion of a misguided
interpretation of stare decisis as a rationale for maintaining the dual
sovereignty doctrine. 45 Commentators argue that the Court fails to
40 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
4' Id.
42 See, e.g., Michael A. Dawson, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and
the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 290-92 (1992); Daniel A.
Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Pros-
ecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 1, 36
(1992).
4' Braun, suprzi note 42, at 11.
" See, e.g., Braun, supra note 42, at 36-37.
41 Id. at 14-23.
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promote the goals of stare decisis because it relies on weak
precedent and because it has inconsistently applied the doctrine.'
Finally, critics refute the Court's preservation of an outdated notion
of federalism, which, in effect, the dual sovereignty doctrine
promotes.47
A. Legal Fiction as a Basis for the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine
The application of the dual sovereignty doctrine to allow
successive prosecutions by federal and state governments is based
on legal fiction. 4 At common law, the dual sovereignty doctrine
only allowed federal governments to reprosecute offenses that had
already been tried in competent jurisdictions abroad.49 Therefore,
the dual sovereignty doctrine did not apply to federal and state
governments within one nation. The dual sovereignty doctrine was
designed primarily to prevent conflict between different nations
which both wished to prosecute a defendant whose single act
violated the laws of both nations.5 ° For the purpose of avoiding
international conflict over which nation would conduct the
prosecution, the dual sovereignty doctrine enabled different federal
governments to conduct successive prosecutions under these
circumstances." The dual sovereignty doctrine, however, was not
contemplated as a means of enabling reprosecutions within a single
46 See Braun, supra note 42, at 22-23 (Court relies on weak precedent);
Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy, Dual Sovereignty, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA
L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 2-3, on file with author) (Court has
altered the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine by redefining the scope
of the term "offense").
47 See generally Braun, supra note 42; Murchison, supra note 7.
4 Braun, supra note 42, at 67-71.
49 Grant, supra note 30, at 8.
'0 MILLER, supra note 29, at 3.
' Id.
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52
nation.
The Supreme Court has mistakenly extended the dual sover-
eignty doctrine, originally intended to be applied to different
nations, to allow the reprosecution of defendants whose acts
violated the laws of both the federal government and a state
government.13 The Supreme Court fails to distinguish the sep-
aration of powers that exists between two nations from the separa-
tion of powers that exists between federal and state governments
within the same nation. 4 Therefore, the Court has erroneously
concluded that the dual sovereignty doctrine applies equally to
successive prosecutions by the federal and state governments of the
United States.
B. The Dual Sovereignty.Doctrine Originated as Dicta
Despite the Supreme Court's strong support of the dual
sovereignty doctrine, the doctrine first appeared in United States
case law in 1847 as mere dicta. At that time, few offenses were
outlawed by the Constitution or Congress. 6 Therefore, it was
unlikely that a single offense would violate the laws of both federal
and state governments. As a result, the earliest Supreme Court
opinions discussing the dual sovereignty doctrine could barely
speculate about how the doctrine would actually be applied, much
52 Braun, supra note 42, at 25-30; see also Martin Conboy, Federal Criminal
Law, in 1 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 295, 305 (1937) (although the
Framers intended states to be sovereign-like, they did not fully consider them to
be separate sovereigns).
5 See cases cited supra note 32.
54 See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959); Braun, supra
note 42, at 25.
5 Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
56 In 1790, the federal government had jurisdiction over the following
offenses: treason, piracy, counterfeiting, perjury, bribery of federal judges,
murder and other crimes on the high seas, and infractions of the law of nations.
Braun, supra note 42, at 4; Conboy, supra note 52, at 301.
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less support it as strong legal principle. 7 Despite the impertinent
inclusion of the dual sovereignty doctrine in these early opinions,
subsequent Supreme Court Justices mistakenly relied on these cases
to reinforce the origin of the doctrine and, surprisingly, to uphold
the doctrine's application in contemporary cases. 8
C. The Supreme Court Has Applied the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine Inconsistently
Although the Supreme Court has consistently defended the dual
sovereignty doctrine for the sake of upholding precedent, the
Court's application of the doctrine has been erratic. By adopting
varied interpretations of the double jeopardy clause, the Court has
often modified the circumstances to which the dual sovereignty
doctrine applies. 9 In interpreting the double jeopardy clause, the
Court's variation of what constitutes the "same offense,"60 for
example, has changed the scope of the double jeopardy clause
significantly. Since the dual sovereignty doctrine is invoked only
when a defendant is prosecuted twice for the same offense, the
variation of the dual sovereignty doctrine's scope has led to its
inconsistent application. Moreover, the Court's inconsistent
interpretation contradicts its emphasis on stare decisis as a reason
for upholding the dual sovereignty doctrine.
In its application of the dual sovereignty doctrine after 1932,
the Supreme Court defined "same offense" narrowly, allowing
reprosecution of a defendant's single act as long as each charge
57 See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); United States v.
Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); Fox, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410. In these
cases, the Court discussed, as dicta, a hypothetical situation in which a
defendant's single act violated both federal and state law.
58 See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136, reh'g denied, 360 U.S.
907 (1959) (Justice Frankfurter considered the preceding cases involving the dual
sovereignty doctrine as "a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive
adjudication").
" See Herman, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
6o See U.S. CONST. amend. V, supra note 3.
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required proof of an element that had not been proved in prosecut-
ing the other charge.61 In Blockburger v. United States,62 the
defendant was arrested for separate sales of morphine hydrochlo-
ride to the same purchaser on successive days and charged for each
sale as separate offenses. In a 1990 case, however, the Court
broadly defined "same offense" as the "same conduct."63 To
illustrate, under this standard, the defendant in Bartkus could not
have been successively prosecuted for violating both the Federal
Bank Robbery Statute and the Illinois state robbery statute because
both prosecutions were based on essentially the same conduct.
6 4
However, this standard was short-lived and, in 1993, the Court
overruled the "same conduct" test in United States v. Dixon.65 In
Dixon, the Court returned to the Blockburger standard by narrowly
defining "same offense" and allowing reprosecution whenever one
charge required proof of merely a single element unnecessary for
proving the second charge. 66 Consequently, the determination of
whether a defendant's single act could be reprosecuted varied
greatly, based upon the Court's definition of "same offense" at the
time of the prosecution.
D. The Supreme Court Upholds the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine to Promote an Obsolete Model of Federalism
The Supreme Court continues to uphold the dual sovereignty
doctrine in a futile attempt to preserve a traditional concept of
federalism that has already become obsolete. The goal of federal-
ism is to afford a balance of powers between federal and state
6' Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
62 id.
6 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
4 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959).
65 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
6d.
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governments. 67 The Constitution achieved this balance of powers
"by specifying those powers Congress might exercise ... and by
emphasizing (in the Tenth Amendment) that undelegated powers
were 'reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."' 68 The
Court's traditional concept of federalism features a strict separation
of powers between federal and state governments. 69 More recent-
ly, the Court has mistakenly concluded that the survival of its
traditional model of federalism depends upon the continuation of
the dual sovereignty doctrine.70 Yet the reconfiguration of crimi-
nal jurisdictions has eliminated the distinction between the
prosecutorial authority of federal and state governments.7 There-
fore, the traditional concept of federalism is no longer applicable
in this area.
The Supreme Court has upheld the dual sovereignty doctrine
because the doctrine satisfies both factions of the federalism debate.
On one hand, the dual sovereignty doctrine is credited as promoting
a strong central government because it preserves the federal
government's authority to prosecute a defendant even if the state
also wants to prosecute the defendant for the same act. In this way,
the federal government can maintain its power to "promote the
general welfare." '72 On the other hand, the dual sovereignty
doctrine is credited as preserving the states' power to prosecute
67 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 65 (12th ed. 1991).
6 Id.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 382 (1922) (an act violating
both federal and state law is an offense against both sovereigns and may be
punished by each).
70 See Braun, supra note 42, at 31-36 (the traditional model of federalism is
not the only workable model for maintaining a balance of powers between
federal and state governments).
7! Conboy, supra note 52, at 304-05.
72 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
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crime, which has been historically considered a localized issue.73
The doctrine achieves this goal by preserving the states' authority
to prosecute a criminal offense without being barred by a federal
prosecution.
Ironically, despite the Court's devoted continuation of the dual
sovereignty doctrine, the traditional concept of federalism has
become obsolete.74 Congress's modification of prosecutorial
jurisdictions75 has already irreversibly impacted federalism by
redefining the boundaries of criminal authority among federal and
state governments. Although crime has traditionally been consid-
ered a local issue,76 Congress began federalizing crime when it
passed the original mail fraud statute77 in 1872.78 The gradual
convergence of federal and state criminal jurisdictions has increas-
ingly blurred the distinction between federal and state prosecutorial
authority.79 Even if the present application of the dual sovereignty
doctrine perpetuates, it cannot preserve the traditional model of
federalism. In adhering to its vision of traditional federalism, the
Court has miscalculated the effects of eliminating the dual
sovereignty doctrine and, therefore, has postulated false concerns
about a single-prosecution system.
73 See GUNTHER, supra note 67, at 137 ("Criminal laws are among the
clearest examples of ... regulation of 'traditionally local' concerns.").
7' Braun, supra note 42, at 31-36.
75 Conboy, supra note 52, at 342.
76 See MILLER, supra note 29, at 34 ("The original Constitution generally
reserved to the states the tasks of crime control and criminal law enforcement.").
77 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
78 Braun, supra note 42, at 4.
79 See Braun, supra 42, at 70-72. The author expresses concern about
cooperative federalism eventually giving rise to collusion between federal and
state prosecutors against criminal defendants. The possibility of this scenario
further demonstrates the changing parameters of modern criminal prosecution
from those that were in place when the dual sovereignty doctrine was originally
conscripted into United States law.
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IV. EVALUATING THE SUPREME COURT'S CONCERNS
ABOUT ELIMINATING THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court mistakenly anticipates that the elimination
of the dual sovereignty doctrine would cause the fall of federal-
ism.80 The Court errs in its assumption that without the dual
sovereignty doctrine, federal and state prosecutors would compete
for the exclusive opportunity to prosecute a defendant whose single
act has violated both federal and state laws.8' In actual practice,
federal and state prosecutors have become increasingly cooperative
with one another because many state and federal criminal laws
prohibit the same behavior.82 Moreover, an analysis of the pros-
ecution of dual sovereignty offenses under the alternative single-
prosecution system demonstrates how the elimination of the dual
sovereignty doctrine would enhance this cooperation between
federal and state prosecutors.83 Furthermore, the Court misap-
prehends the destructive effect of a single-prosecution system on
federalism.
A. Elimination of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Would
Not Jeopardize the Federal Government's Prosecutorial
Power
One rationale for the Supreme Court's erroneous continuation
of the dual sovereignty doctrine is that the doctrine preserves the
federal government's power to prosecute violations of federal law,
namely, violations of the Constitution and Congressional Acts. This
view, known as the "federalist" view, centers around the main-
80 See cases cited supra note 20 and accompanying text.
82 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); see also supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
82 Braun, supra note 42; Conboy, supra note 52, at 300.
8. See Braun, supra note 42, at 67-70 (describing the high level of
cooperation between federal and state prosecutors under the existing prosecutorial
system).
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tenance of a strong centralized govemment.84 Federalists are
generally concerned that if the dual sovereignty doctrine were
eliminated, the states would be granted exclusive authority over
crime" since crime traditionally has been considered a local
issue." However, history refutes this concern because federal
criminal jurisdiction has steadily expanded into what has been
traditionally considered state criminal jurisdiction. 7 Federalists on
the Court have erroneously contended that the elimination of the
dual sovereignty doctrine would preclude the federal government
from prosecuting federal criminal offenses.88
Further, the federalist rationale is flawed because, in a single-
prosecution system,89 the federal prosecutor would nevertheless
14 MILLER, supra note 29, at 1.
" See Heath, 474 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Yet were a
prosecution by a State, however zealously pursued, allowed to preclude further
prosecution by the Federal Government for the same crime, an entire range of
national interests could be frustrated."); see also Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 195 (1985) (Brennan, J.) ("the efficiency of federal law enforcement
must suffer if the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents successive state and federal
prosecutions").
86 See MILLER, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, which provides for federal prosecution of
"loansharking," is a permissible exercise by Congress of its powers under the
Commerce Clause).
8 See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907
(1959) (Court protected balance of prosecutorial powers between federal and
state governments); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (Court protected
government's power to fully prosecute an offense that violates both federal and
state law).
'9 See supra note 23 ("single-prosecution system" refers to the system of
criminal prosecution that would exist in the absence of the dual sovereignty
doctrine).
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participate in the prosecution of dual sovereignty offenses.9" First,
both federal and state prosecutors would determine which juris-
diction stood a better chance of convicting the defendant. Indeed,
without the option of reprosecuting, federal and state prosecutors
would tend to be more rigorous in accurately determining which
jurisdiction best responds to the public interest. Second, even if the
respective prosecutors were to decide that the state is the preferred
jurisdiction, the federal prosecutor would still be able to facilitate
the state prosecution.9' Under a single-prosecution system, it
would be in the federal prosecutor's best interest to cooperate with
the state to maximize their shared objective of convicting.
In United States v. Aboumoussallem,92 for example, the federal
government prosecuted Yagih Aboumoussallem on drug charges
after the state had acquitted him for identical charges.93 Under a
single-prosecution system, the federal and state prosecutors in
Aboumoussallem94 would conceivably have made a pre-trial
determination that there was a better chance of convicting the
0 This note will use the term "dual sovereignty offense" to describe the
situation when a criminal defendant's single act has violated both federal and
state laws.
9' See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 360 U.S. 907 (1959)
(Court held that one exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine's general
allowance of successive prosecutions is when one prosecutor is merely acting as
an agent of the other prosecutor. However, the Court has generally permitted
substantial cooperation between federal and state prosecutors on any specific
case). See, e.g., United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Second Circuit did not consider a joint investigation of criminal activity by
federal and state governments to constitute one sovereign acting as a "tool" of
the other).
The Court, in general, has encouraged cooperative law enforcement efforts.
Therefore, the Court has rarely found that one prosecutor has acted as an agent
of the other prosecutor. See Braun, supra note 42, at 67-71 (Court has
encouraged cooperation between federal and state prosecutors).
92 726 P.2d 906.
91 Id.
94id.
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defendant on the federal charge. After such a determination, the
federal government would have conducted the sole prosecution with
the cooperation of the state prosecutor and successfully convicted
the defendant, as it eventually did, without putting the defendant
twice in jeopardy and without wasting the time and expense of the
state court. The elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would
change the roles of the federal and state prosecutors without
excluding either one from participating in the prosecution.
B. Elimination of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Would
Not Jeopardize State Governments' Prosecutorial
Powers
Contrary to the federalist view, an alternative rationale for the
Court's continuation of the dual sovereignty doctrine is that the
doctrine's elimination would deprive the states of their traditional
power to prosecute crime.' This "states' rights" position centers
around a belief in upholding the states' residual constitutional
powers.96 Even without the dual sovereignty doctrine, Congress
would not be able to expand its authority over criminal prosecution
indefinitely by asserting its Constitutional powers. In 1993, for
instance, the Supreme Court limited Congress' expansion of federal
prosecutorial power under the Commerce Clause.97 Even if
Congress could expand federal authority to encompass all criminal
offenses, it would conceivably lack the resources with which to
9 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (O'Connor, J.) ("o deny
a State its power to enforce its criminal laws . . . 'would be a shocking and
untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the States to maintain
peace and order within their confines."') (quoting Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137); see
also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 450 (1970) (Brennan, J.) ("For it has long
been recognized as the very essence of our federalism that the States should have
the widest latitude in the administration of their own systems of criminal
justice.") (quoting Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468, reh'g denied, 357
U.S. 933 (1958)).
96 See Heath, 474 U.S. at 93.
9 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, reh'g denied, 9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.
1993).
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exclusively prosecute all criminal offenses.9" At present, the
federal prosecutor does not reprosecute every criminal offense over
which it has concurrent jurisdiction with the states.99
The elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would not
preclude the states from prosecuting violators of state criminal
statutes. Similar to the federal prosecutor, under a single-pros-
ecution system, the state prosecutor would participate in the
prosecution of dual sovereignty offenses. In Bartkus'" for exam-
ple, the state prosecuted the defendant for violating a state robbery
statute' o' after he had been acquitted of a federal charge for
violating the Federal Bank Robbery Statute.'0 2 These successive
prosecutions were both based on the same act of robbing a
federally insured savings and loan association. Under a single-
prosecution system, the state and federal prosecutors would
conceivably have made a pre-trial determination that the state had
a better chance of convicting the defendant. The state prosecutor
9' See Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights
Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 35, on file with author) (commenting on how
the deficiency of resources prevents federal law enforcement from usurping the
role of prosecuting local police misconduct).
99 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-2.142 (1980). In 1959, the
Department of Justice instituted the "Petite policy," which only allows federal
reprosecutions when there are compelling reasons and when the Assistant
Attorney General approves. Statistically, it is difficult to determine the number
of federal reprosecutions conducted because the Department of Justice compiles
an annual total of prosecutions it conducts, but does not indicate how many of
these are reprosecutions. But see YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2 (7th ed. 1990) ("Of the roughly
1.5 million felony prosecutions brought in this country each year, over 95% are
state prosecutions." Deductively, this indicates that since federal prosecutions
comprise a small percentage of total prosecutions, the number of federal
reprosecutions is also relatively low.).
'00 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
101 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 601.1 (1951).
'02 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1988).
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then would have conducted the sole prosecution, with the co-
operation of the federal prosecutor, and could have convicted the
defendant without unconstitutionally reprosecuting the defendant or
wasting the time and expense of the federal court.' °3 This ar-
rangement would have been the inverse of the Aboumoussallem'0 4
scenario in which the federal prosecutor apparently had a better
chance of convicting the defendant.105 In each case, both the state
and federal prosecutor would have been involved in the prosecu-
tion, one playing the lead and the other facilitating. Here, the
elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would merely change
the roles of the federal and state prosecutors without excluding
either from participating in the prosecution altogether.
The elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would, in
effect, reduce competition between prosecutors to conduct the
initial prosecution. Several states already prohibit state reprosecu-
tion after an initial federal prosecution has been conducted.1 6
Realizing the unfairness of successive prosecutions, these states
03 See Braun, supra note 42, at 73-77 (proposed alternative to dual
sovereignty doctrine addresses the motivation promoted by cooperative
federalism).
'o 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984).
'os See Section IV (A) supra.
'o See Braun, supra note 42, at 5 n.15 (ALA. CODE. § 12.20.010 (1984);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-112 (1978); ARK. CODE ANN. § 43-1224.1 (Michie
1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-303
(1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 209 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-8 (Michie
1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-112 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-315 (1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-5
(West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3108(3) (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.045 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-11-504 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 1-11 (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney's 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-03-13 (1991);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 130 (1991); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 111 (Purdon
1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-404 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294
(Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.43.040 (West 1990); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 939.71 (West 1982)).
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have passed legislation to prohibit state reprosecutions. °7 Despite
the intent of these statutes to prevent successive prosecutions,
prosecutors in those states can avoid the impact of the law by
simply conducting the initial prosecution. If the state prosecutes
first, the federal government is then able to conduct a second
prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant has been convicted
or acquitted of the state charges.
Alternatively, a single-prosecution system would not reward
those states for conducting the initial prosecution of a dual
sovereignty offense by then allowing the federal government to
reprosecute. For example, California, under its own state law, in
United States v. Koon,0 8 would have lost the opportunity to
prosecute the police officers accused of beating Rodney King had
it not prosecuted the state charge of police misconduct before the
federal government prosecuted the federal civil rights violation."
Under a single-prosecution system, however, California would only
be interested in prosecuting ahead of the federal government if the
state had a better chance of convicting. Since the elimination of the
dual sovereignty doctrine would allow only one prosecution, federal
and state prosecutors would naturally want to maximize their one
opportunity to convict.
Under a single-prosecution system, rather than "race to the
courthouse"' " for the sake of maximizing the quantity of prose-
cutions, California's incentive for initiating prosecution would be
to maximize the quality of prosecution. Consequently, if the Koon
case had been tried under a single-prosecution system, the govern-
107 See Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy Wars: The Case For A Civil Rights
Exception, 41 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 5 n. 16, on file
with author) ('The Illinois legislature, in response to Bartkus's affirmation of its
authority to reprosecute after a federal court, changed its laws a few months after
the decision to prohibit such reprosecutions.").
'0' 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
1o9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 656 (West 1992) (California statute prohibits state
prosecution of a criminal offense after the federal government has prosecuted for
the "same act or omission").
110 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 101 (1985).
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ment could have conducted an effective prosecution of the
defendant and saved the time and expense of reprosecuting, while
the defendant could have avoided the deprivation of his constitu-
tional rights. Therefore, in states that already prohibit reprosecution,
a single-prosecution system would eliminate the state prosecutor's
ulterior motive for prosecuting a dual sovereignty offense first,
since an unsuccessful state prosecution could not be salvaged by a
subsequent federal reprosecution."'
C. Elimination of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Would
Not Prevent Adequate Prosecution of Criminal Offenses
The Supreme Court permits successive prosecutions, emphasiz-
ing that a defendant accused of violating federal and state laws is
not adequately prosecuted unless both offenses have been tried. .
2
The Court has stated that an act violating the laws of two sover-
eigns is subject to separate punishment by each respective sover-
eign.' 3 The Court contends that by discontinuing successive
prosecutions, the elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would
allow defendants to evade one sovereign's charges when the other
sovereign conducted the prosecution.
The Supreme Court fears that if a case like Bartkus were tried
by the state under a single-prosecution system, the defendant would
be prosecuted for violating the state robbery statute, but would
evade prosecution for violating the Federal Bank Robbery Stat-
ute.' 14 But the Court has assumed that a single-prosecution
system would fail to adequately prosecute defendants simply
because it would reduce the quantity of prosecutions. In making
this assumption, the Court has ignored the substance of the
. See Bill Girdner, Different Results in New Cop Trial, A.B.A. J., June
1993, at 16 (the federal prosecutor of Sergeant Koon and his fellow police
officers learned from the mistakes made by the state prosecutor in the previous
state trial).
112 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
113 Id.
114 MILLER, supra note 29, at 60-61.
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prosecution as well as the punitive effect of the prosecution on the
defendant.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's fears, the elimination of the
dual sovereignty doctrine would not prevent the adequate pros-
ecution of criminal offenses. By prohibiting successive pros-
ecutions, the elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would
increase the fairness of the government's law enforcement authori-
ty, not render it inadequate. In essence, a single-prosecution system
would eliminate the duplicative and unconstitutional reprosecution
of defendants like Alphonse Bartkus, whose liberty was twice
jeopardized by unsuccessful prosecutors who unfairly enjoyed the
luxury of a second chance." 5
In the interest of fundamental fairness, our government was not
designed to conduct successive prosecutions. The government's
reprosecution of a defendant is precisely what the first Congress
intended to prevent" 6 when it amended the Constitution to
guarantee protection from double jeopardy." 7 Although the
Framers of the Constitution may not have specifically envisioned
dual sovereignty reprosecutions, they seem to have recognized the
importance of protecting defendants from being prosecuted
twice.'' 8
In addition to its departure from the Framers' intent, the dual
sovereignty doctrine is bad policy. The deprivation of defendants'
double jeopardy protection outweighs the benefits that might inure
to the public by conducting successive prosecutions. Since the
elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would merely limit the
"5 See Girdner, supra note II1 and accompanying text.
116 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 201 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (in drafting the Bill of Rights, the first Congress recognized the
undisputed need for the general protection of the double jeopardy clause).
"17 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1X See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (conceivably, the first Congress contemplated successive prosecutions
by federal and state governments when it rejected a proposed amendment to the
double jeopardy clause, which would have prohibited the reprosecution of the
same offense only if brought under federal law).
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quantity of prosecutions and not prevent prosecutions per se, a
single-prosecution system would not foster inadequate law
enforcement. A single-prosecution system offers an alternative that
would accommodate adequate criminal prosecution without
depriving defendants of their constitutional protection against
reprosecution.
Even if the Supreme Court insists that adequate prosecution of
a dual sovereignty offense is only achieved when both federal and
state violations are prosecuted, a single-prosecution system could
be structured to accommodate the prosecution of both violations in
one trial. A single-prosecution system could be designed to enable
federal and state courts to each prosecute both federal and state
violations. In effect, a defendant whose act violated both federal
and state law could then be prosecuted for both violations in a
single trial. Therefore, in addition to protecting defendants'
constitutional protection from double jeopardy, a single-prosecution
system could satisfy the Court's demand for prosecuting both
offenses against dual sovereigns.
Even with only one opportunity to prosecute under a single-
prosecution system, the government could prosecute an offense
against two sovereigns in a single trial if both federal and state
criminal jurisdictions were allowed to prosecute violations against
each sovereign. In United States v. Grimes,1 9 for example, the
defendant pleaded guilty to New Jersey's robbery charge after he
had been convicted on a federal charge of bank robbery stemming
from the same act. Under a single-prosecution system that allowed
the prosecution of both federal and state violations in one trial, the
federal government could have prosecuted both the state and
federal charges at the same federal trial. Similarly, dual sovereignty
offenses could be prosecuted exclusively in state criminal courts
under such a system. Consequently, in cases like Abbate v. United
States,120 where the defendants were convicted of a federal charge
after being convicted of a state charge, the state government could
have prosecuted both the state and federal charges at the same state
trial.
,20 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
641 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1981).
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Allowing the prosecution of both federal and state violations at
one trial would require significant procedural changes.12' Current-
ly, federal and state criminal courts are only allowed to prosecute
violations of their respective criminal codes. 22 Nevertheless,
Congress could resolve this predicament by changing the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to allow federal courts to prosecute
state violations and state criminal courts to prosecute federal
violations when the same offense has violated both federal and
state law."' In civil cases, federal courts have supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims, allowing the federal courts to hear
12' Allowing the prosecution of both federal and state violations at one trial
would probably also require the instatement of a "gatekeeper" to determine
whether the federal or the state prosecutor would try a specific dual sovereignty
offense. This would alleviate the anticipated dilemma of federal and state
prosecutors competing to prosecute a case or, alternatively, seeking to avoid
prosecuting a case. See, e.g., Labaton, A Plea To Reno, supra note 26; Labaton,
Reno To Take Over, supra note 26 (federal and state prosecutors are both wary
of prosecuting the politically charged murder of Yankel Rosenbaum in Crown
Heights).
122 FED. R. CRIM. P. 54 (the jurisdictional limitation on state courts to
prosecute only state violations is implicit in this federal rule).
'2- This note briefly discusses the possibility of allowing federal courts to
prosecute state offenses and state courts to prosecute federal offenses when an
offense has violated both sovereigns. For a thorough analysis of jurisdictional
boundaries, see EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 78-136,
215-16 (2d ed. 1992).
Also, for a discussion regarding an alternative proposal of creating a multi-
jurisdictional court to prosecute dual sovereignty offenses, see Lawrence
Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecution: A
Suggested Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 252, 266 (1961).
Another proposal, made by Alphonse Bartkus's court-appointed counsel, is
to enact a federal statute that would allow defendants to choose the initial
prosecutor -- federal or state. That way, in states like Illinois, which prohibit
reprosecution after an initial federal prosecution, the federal government could
reprosecute if a defendant chose the state to prosecute first, whereas the decision
would be final if a defendant chose the federal government to prosecute first. See
Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 U. MINN. L. REV. 607,
611 (1966).
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state claims that are components of valid federal claims.'24
Similarly, state civil courts have jurisdiction over federal civil
claims, allowing state courts to resolve federal issues when they are
part and parcel of state civil claims. By changing the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, federal and state criminal jurisdictions
would resemble current civil jurisdictions when prosecuting dual
sovereignty offenses."
Although the expansion of jurisdictional boundaries would
substantially impact criminal prosecution, it would enhance the
prospect of eliminating the dual sovereignty doctrine. By allowing
both federal and state courts to prosecute violations against each
sovereign, expanded jurisdictional boundaries would allow the
prosecution of both violations without putting the defendant twice
in jeopardy. Although a jurisdictional expansion would require
federal courts to apply state criminal statutes and state criminal
courts to prosecute violations of critical federal laws, this inter-
change of prosecutorial power between federal and state courts
would only apply when a defendant was being prosecuted for a
dual sovereignty offense. In effect, the jurisdictional expansion
would consolidate two trials into one. Furthermore, the proposed
rule change seems politically viable given the recent Congressional
movement toward developing concurrent criminal jurisdictions
between federal and state governments.' 26
Since the Supreme Court ultimately determines the constitution-
324 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
'2 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 65-81 (1985).
326 The countervailing argument is that Congress has been creating concurrent
criminal jurisdictions in the interest of enhancing the federal government's law
enforcement authority rather than establishing an equitable distribution of
prosecutorial power among the two levels of government.
But Congress's modification of criminal jurisdictions, while expanding
federal prosecutorial authority, has not usurped states' prosecutorial power. See,
e.g., Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (Court limited Congress's expansion of
federal prosecutorial power under the Commerce Clause).
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ality of federal legislation, 27 Congressional alterations of judicial
rules commonly become the subject of Supreme Court cases. When
evaluating Congressional changes to judicial rules, the Court has
traditionally allowed modifications of procedural rights as long as
they do not affect parties' substantive rights.'28 For example, in
its analysis of the Rules Enabling Act as applied to civil cases, the
Court decided to follow the Choice of Law rules authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the applicable state
rules by determining whether the federal .rules would affect a
party's substantive rights.' 29 If the rules only alter procedural
rights, then the Court grants the requested application of those
rules. Similarly, when the Supreme Court determines whether a law
applies retroactively, it denies retroactivity if such application alters
parties' substantive rights, such as stating a cause of action.
However, the Court allows retroactivity if such application only
alters parties' procedural rights, such as the amount of dam-
ages.13 0
By comparison, expanding prosecutorial jurisdictions to allow
federal prosecution of state violations and state prosecution of
federal violations under a single-prosecution system would change
only the procedural rules that govern prosecution and would not
affect the government's substantive interest in enforcing public
safety. Upon passing constitutional muster, Congressional expan-
sion of prosecutorial jurisdictions would enable both federal and
state governments to equally prosecute violations against both
sovereigns. This would permit the prosecution of both violations
127 JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 117-20 (3d ed. 1986).
128 See SCOLES, supra note 123, at 115-17.
129 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
,30 See, e.g., Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985) (Court refused to
apply an amendment to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 to pending claims because it would affect the vested rights and
expectations of the parties).
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comprising dual sovereignty offenses without threatening defend-
ants' constitutional protection from double jeopardy. For example,
in United States v. Koon,'3 the state court or the federal court
could have prosecuted Sergeant Koon for both police misconduct
(state offense) and civil rights violations (federal offense) at the
same trial rather than conduct successive prosecutions.
The expansion of prosecutorial jurisdictions would satisfy the
Supreme Court's concerns about adequate prosecution under a
single-prosecution system even though it would not make state and
federal governments equally powerful. Contrary to the Court's
concerns, by expanding jurisdictional boundaries, a single-
prosecution system could prosecute both violations of a dual
sovereignty offense. 3 2 Although federal and state prosecutorial
jurisdictions would be expanded equally, a single-prosecution
system ultimately requires a decision on whether the federal or
state prosecutor would prosecute a specific dual sovereignty
offense. Regardless of whether prosecutorial jurisdictions were
expanded, the Supremacy Clause 33 would enable the federal
government to preempt a state prosecution of a dual sovereignty
offense if it chose to do so. In United States v. Koon,134 for
example, where the defendant was charged with police misconduct
and federal civil rights violations, the federal government could
have preempted the state from prosecuting the dual sovereignty
offense. Although the Supremacy Clause prevents an equal
distribution of prosecutorial powers between federal and state
governments, it would not prevent a single-prosecution system from
maintaining a balance of powers between the different levels of
government, which is vital to our federalist system of government.
131 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
132 See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922) (Court was
concerned that without the dual sovereignty doctrine, dual offenders could evade
the prosecution of one sovereignty, since only one prosecution would be
allowed).
133 U.S. CONST. art VI.
'34 833 F. Supp. 769, 790.
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Our federalist system of government does not require an equal
distribution of powers to maintain a balance of powers between the
different levels of government. The Constitution's Supremacy
Clause binds the states by the authority of federal law, ultimately
giving the federal government supremacy over the states. 35
Although the Tenth Amendment assigns the residual constitutional
powers to the states, it does not offset the Supremacy Clause, but
merely compensates for it by proportionally empowering the
states. 136
The Supreme Court's insistence on establishing parity between
federal and state prosecutors by affording each level of government
an equal opportunity to prosecute the same defendant departs from
the goal of federalism. The purpose of establishing and maintaining
a balance of powers between federal and state governments is to
ultimately ensure individual democratic power.'37 The concept of
federalism is designed to maximize individual rights by balancing
smaller state governments, which ideally are more responsive to
individual and local interests, against a strong federal govern-
ment."'
Successive prosecutions dangerously allow the government to
broaden its prosecutorial authority at the expense of individual
rights, particularly defendants' constitutional right to be free from
double jeopardy. By allowing successive prosecutions, the Court
purports to protect public welfare and safety at the expense of the
individual defendant's liberty rights. However, a single-prosecution
system would not deny the state's interest in prosecuting crimes on
behalf of the general public. On the contrary, a single-prosecution
system would protect the defendant's rights without jeopardizing
the public's interest in welfare and safety.
135 U.S. CONST. art VI.
1,6 U.S. CONST. amend. X. If the residual powers assigned to the states by
the Tenth Amendment were intended to offset the powers granted to the federal
government by the Sixth Amendment, the title "Supremacy Clause" would be a
misnomer, since the federal and state powers would, in effect, be equal.
1.7 Newman, supra note 7, at 256.
1-" Neumann, supra note 21, at 45-47.
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Consider the effects of a single-prosecution system on a case
like United States v. Koon. 39 Sergeant Koon was charged with
police misconduct by the state prosecutor and with civil rights
violations by the federal prosecutor.' 40 Since the offense involved
a serious violation of federal civil rights law, the federal govern-
ment would have conceivably preempted the state from prosecuting
the excessive force charge under a single-prosecution system. In
that case, Officer Koon would still have been successfully convict-
ed, in the interest of the public, yet his liberty would not have been
twice put in jeopardy. Although the federal prosecutor exercised the
authority to preempt the state prosecutor, the state's interest in
prosecuting the defendant would have been served without
depriving the defendant's own constitutional right. Therefore, a
single-prosecution system would provide a better means for
achieving federalism's ultimate objective of increasing individual
democratic power.
The federal government's prosecutorial authority under a single-
prosecution system would not be disproportionate to the states'
authority. Even if the states were preempted from prosecuting
certain dual sovereignty offenses, the federal government could still
represent the states' interest in prosecuting violations of their own
criminal statutes. The single opportunity to prosecute a defendant
whose act violates both federal and state law, which is inherent in
a single-prosecution system, would discourage the federal govern-
ment from prosecuting any dual sovereignty offense in which the
state had a better chance of convicting. Additionally, the federal
government's resources would be freed from the burden of
1"9 833 F. Supp. 769.
140 In this case, as with many reprosecutions, the federal prosecutor had not
decided to charge Sergeant Koon with civil rights charges until after the state
trial. Id. However, prohibiting successive prosecutions under a single-prosecution
system would eliminate this predicament. A single-prosecution system would
encourage federal and state prosecutors to conduct more thorough pre-trial
investigations to determine any possible charges, since there would be only one
opportunity to prosecute the defendant for any violations stemming from the
single act. For the same reason, a single-prosecution system would simultaneous-
ly discourage a hasty decision about which level of government would conduct
the prosecution.
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prosecuting offenses that could adequately be performed by the
state. Alternatively, when a dual sovereignty offense involves a
violation of a critical federal law such as civil rights law, the
federal government's power to preempt could remove the pros-
ecution to the federal courts.
D. Elimination of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Would
Deter Sham Prosecutions
Aside from fearing the destruction of federalism, the Supreme
Court is concerned that if the dual sovereignty doctrine were
eliminated, sham prosecutions would proliferate. Prosecutors
conduct sham prosecutions by colluding with the defendant to
prevent a conviction. 4' Sham prosecutions were reported as
common practice in the southeastern states during the civil rights
movement when white prosecutors cooperated with white defen-
dants to acquit the defendants of charges filed by black vic-
tims.'42 Although sham prosecutions may not be as pervasive as
they were in the 1960's, the danger of such practice does
persist. 43
But the Supreme Court misapplies the dual sovereignty doctrine
as a remedy for sham prosecutions. Currently, when a sham
prosecution is discovered, the defendant is reprosecuted, but the
prosecutor is not sanctioned. Presumably, while no prosecutors
would want their cases to be retried because of prosecutorial
misconduct, the threat of reprosecution does not sufficiently deter
sham prosecutions. Furthermore, it is unjust to subject the defen-
dant to a second trial, in violation of his or her guaranteed
protection from double jeopardy, while the prosecutor, who shared
responsibility for the sham, goes unpunished.
141 See Braun supra note 42, at 71-72.
142 Hoffman, supra note 107, manuscript at 12-14.
143 See Herman, supra note 46, manuscript at 22-23 (the ACLU has
considered the danger of sham prosecutions to formulate its policy position on
successive prosecutions of a criminal defendant for a single act under the dual
sovereignty doctrine).
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The elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would actually
deter sham prosecutions. Under a single-prosecution system, federal
and state prosecutors would be more accountable to one another.
Indeed, if the federal government agreed for the state to conduct
the sole prosecution of a criminal defendant who had violated both
state and federal law, it would be in the federal prosecutor's best
interest to ensure that the state prosecutor was successful. For
example, in Aboumoussallem,'44 under a single-prosecution
system, the acquittal in state court would have barred reprosecution
in federal court. Therefore, it would have been in the best interest
of the federal prosecutor to vigilantly help the state prosecutor
conduct the best prosecution possible, knowing that there was only
one chance to convict. Consequently, such prosecutorial co-
operation would reduce the chance of a prosecutor conducting a
sham prosecution.
Although the elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would
contribute to the deterrence of sham prosecutions, the courts need
a more effective means of eliminating such practices. One approach
might be for the courts to allow separate civil sanctions to be
brought against a prosecutor who conducts a sham prosecution.
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A more drastic option would be to apply criminal penalties to
prosecutors for conducting sham prosecutions. Contrary to the
Supreme Court's concern that the elimination of the dual sover-
eignty doctrine would increase the occurrence of sham pros-
ecutions, a single-prosecution system would deter shams by
increasing prosecutorial accountability. Nevertheless, any deterrence
would be minimal unless the elimination of the dual sovereignty
doctrine were supplemented by directly penalizing prosecutors who
conduct sham prosecutions.
E. Elimination of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Would
Not Diminish Federal Civil Rights
The Supreme Court misapplies the dual sovereignty doctrine as
a means of prosecuting federal civil rights violations. Generally, the
144 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984).
' Herman, supra note 46, manuscript at 23.
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civil rights movement has benefitted from reprosecution because it
provides a means for convicting defendants of federal civil rights
violations who have been acquitted of state charges due to sham
prosecutions or racist juries and judges.' 4 Civil rights advocates
have debated the preferred route for which to advocate: (1) keep
the dual sovereignty doctrine intact, (2) eliminate the dual sover-
eignty doctrine altogether, or (3) modify the doctrine so that it still
allows reprosecution for a violation of federal civil rights law. 47
Under a single-prosecution system, dual sovereignty offenders
could not evade charges for violating federal civil rights law. Since
federal and state prosecutors would coordinate with each other to
determine the more appropriate jurisdiction to prosecute, the federal
government would most likely preempt the state from prosecuting.
Consequently, it would be in the state prosecutor's best interest to
assist and monitor the federal prosecutor to ensure a conviction of
such a serious violation. If, on the other hand, the state were in a
better position to convict, it could prosecute both the state and
federal violation while the federal prosecutor assisted and mon-
itored the state's prosecution.
Since the states are currently prohibited from prosecuting
federal violations,' 4 some states have passed bias-crime legisla-
tion to proscribe civil rights violations in the state. 49 Such
'46Under these circumstances, reprosecution has achieved the important goal
of protecting equality. However, reprosecution is an unacceptable means of
achieving that goal because it deprives defendants of their constitutional
protection from double jeopardy. For further analysis of this issue, see Herman,
supra note 46, manuscript at 4-5.
147 See generally Herman, supra note 46; Hoffman, supra note 107.
14" FED. R. CRIM. P. 54, supra note 122 and accompanying text.
149 Proposed '"bias crime" bills aim to enforce stricter penalties against
criminal defendants if their criminal act was bias-motivated against a member of
a protected class, e.g., on the basis of race, gender, religion, age, physical
handicap, and sometimes sexual orientation. The Senate and Assembly of the
New York State Legislature have each proposed different versions of a "bias
crime" bill. The Assembly bill increases the penalty for a bias-motivated crime
that was committed on the basis of the victim's sexual orientation. (N.Y.A. 2103,
216th Sess. 1993). On the contrary, the Senate version excludes sexual
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legislation enables state prosecutors to try dual sovereignty
offenders for both the violation of state law and the violation of the
victim's civil rights. Therefore, under state bias-crime law, Sergeant
Koon, for example, could have been prosecuted at one trial in
California for the police misconduct charge and for committing a
bias-crime against Rodney King.150
However, bias-crime laws dangerously arm state prosecutors
with broad discretion to enforce them.151 Bias-crime laws enable
state prosecutors to add another charge of bias-crime against
defendants who are arrested for committing a crime of violence if
the victim is a member of a protected class. 52 Although in-
creased punishment for bias-motivated crime may be popular, bias-
crime laws are ripe for abuse by overzealous prosecutors. Addition-
ally, since a defendant's motivation is difficult to prove, bias-crime
laws are prone to arbitrary enforcement. This approach is as unfair
as the government's present method of arbitrarily reprosecuting a
defendant after an unpopular acquittal at the initial prosecution. 3
orientation from among the protected class distinctions. (N.Y.S. 1424, 216th
Sess. 1993). For an analysis of bias crime statutes, see generally Marc Fleisher,
Hate Crimes, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
'5' United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
'1 See generally Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But
Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemnmas of
Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333 (1991); Fleisher, supra note
149.
152 See supra note 151. Although prosecutors would need to show a basis for
alleging that the defendant committed a bias crime, such legislation runs the
same danger of prosecutorial abuse that is inherent in the dual sovereignty
doctrine.
153 See, e.g., Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769 (Koon was reprosecuted in the wake
of violent rioting in Los Angeles -- an apparent response to the state acquittal of
Koon and his fellow officers).
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F. Elimination of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Would
Enhance the Efficiency of the Judicial System
While efficiency alone is not a sufficient reason to restructure
the criminal prosecution system, it is a significant factor in
considering the elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine. By
prohibiting reprosecution of defendants whose single act violates
federal and state law, the Supreme Court would reduce the number
of criminal trials by the number of reprosecutions that would have
otherwise been conducted under the dual sovereignty doctrine.
Although this number may not be substantial, the reduction would,
nonetheless, ease the burden of the courts' caseload. The elim-
ination of the dual sovereignty doctrine would, therefore, enhance
the efficiency of the judicial system.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the Supreme Court's concerns, the elimination of
the dual sovereignty doctrine would not destroy federalism. In fact,
the institution of a single-prosecution system would maintain the
balance of powers between federal and state governments that is
vital to our system of federalism. The elimination of the dual
sovereignty doctrine would appropriately restore defendants'
constitutional protection from double jeopardy without jeopardizing
the government's interest in prosecuting criminal defendants.
Furthermore, by expanding prosecutorial jurisdictions for dual
sovereignty offenses, a single-prosecution system could increase the
quality of prosecution while continuing to allow the prosecution of
both federal and state violations. In addition, a single-prosecution
system would deter sham prosecutions and preserve federal civil
rights by limiting the opportunity to prosecute a defendant whose
act violates both federal and state law. Such limitation would
demand greater accountability from federal and state prosecutors
and enhance the efficiency of the judicial system by reducing its
caseload. Finally, elimination of the dual sovereignty doctrine
would revive public faith in the judiciary by abolishing the
unpredictable practice of conducting successive prosecutions.

